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Introduction 
Samuel Finley Breese Morse initiated the telecommunications 
revolution with his invention of the first functional electro-magnetic 
telegraph in the 1830s.1 For the first time in human history, 
communication of information over long distances was no longer 
inexorably tied to the speed of horses or ships, or clumsily telegraphed 
short distances by smoke or flags.2 Information traveled as fast as 
electricity. Morse’s telegraph was heralded at the time as the “Lightning 
Line” and Morse himself was called the “Lightning Man.”3 But Morse 
also casts a long shadow over the United States patent system, or, more 
precisely, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney casts this shadow with his 1854 
opinion in the seminal case of O’Reilly v. Morse.4 
In Morse, Chief Justice Taney invalidated a portion of Morse’s 
primary patent on his invention of the electro-magnetic telegraph on 
the ground that Morse aggrandized control over communications 
technologies in his patent far beyond what he had in fact invented.5 
Similar to the telecommunications revolution born of Morse’s invention, 
Chief Justice Taney’s Morse opinion has been a fountainhead decision 
in U.S. patent law whose effects are felt to this day.6 
Judges and scholars largely agree that Morse was correctly decided. 
There is a legalistic dispute about what specific rule in patent law was 
applied in the case, whether it was a problem with Morse claiming an 
 
1. Morse’s first patent issued on the American Electro-Magnetic Telegraph 
in 1840, see U.S. Patent No. 1,647 (issued June 20, 1840). 
2. See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The 
Transformation of America, 1815–1848, at 1 (2007) (“For thousands 
of years messages had been limited by the speed with which messengers 
could travel and the distance at which eyes could see signals such as flags 
or smoke.”). 
3. Kenneth Silverman, Lightning Man: The Accursed Life of Samuel 
F.B. Morse 240, 244 (2004); see also Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511, 
519–20 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,036) (stating that Morse’s telegraph 
“literally gives ‘letters to lightning,’ as well as ‘lightning to letters’”). 
4. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
5. See id. at 113 (“[Morse] shuts the door against inventions of other 
persons . . . . For he says he does not confine his claim to the machinery or 
parts of machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a monopoly 
in its use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at a distance. . . . 
The court is of the opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted 
by law.”). 
6. See Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law 
and Policy: Cases and Materials 110 (6th ed. 2013) (“Morse’s invention 
also occurred at the beginning of a revolution in patent law as significant as 
the one in communications.”). 
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unpatentable abstract idea or his failing the enablement requirement,7 
but this is what William Blackstone would call a debate of “scholastic 
refinement.”8 Morse is recognized as a foundational case that reached 
the right decision.9 It is in law school casebooks10 and treatises.11 Modern 
courts continue to cite it as authoritative precedent.12 Morse was 
extensively discussed and debated by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in a decision that applied its rule to a patent on a new 
method of making an automobile axle, holding that it was an invalid 
claim to abstract idea.13 The Supreme Court continues to cite Morse as 
controlling precedent in patent eligibility cases, especially in its recent 
decisions addressing the patentability of modern innovations such as 
computer software programs and biotech-based medical tests.14  
Such universal approbation obscures an important truth: It is an 
anachronism. It is anachronistic for at least two reasons. First, it fails 
to account for significant differences in U.S. patent law between the 
Antebellum Era and today, especially in the key difference in the nature 
 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 22–24 (identifying dispute whether Morse 
is enablement or patent eligibility case). 
8. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *8 (noting the differences in detail 
between the prominent natural rights philosophers, Hugo Grotius, Samuel 
Pufendorf, and John Locke). 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 6, at 107–14; F. Scott Kieff, Pauline 
Newman, Herbert F. Schwartz & Henry E. Smith, Principles of 
Patent Law: Cases and Materials 156–63 (Robert C. Clark ed., 4th ed. 
2008); Craig Allen Nard, The Law of Patents 92–96 (4th ed. 2017). 
11. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Law 56–
58 (2008); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Law 284 (3d ed. 2009); Roger 
E. Schechter & John R. Thomas, Principles of Patent Law 187 
(2004). 
12. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, Inc., 722 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 
2013); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1280–81 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring), aff’d, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); 
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (en banc); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(Linn, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon 
Corp., 497 F. Supp. 661, 680–81 (D. Del. 1980). 
13. See American Axle & Mfg. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285, 1297, 
1301–02, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (including extensive debate between 
the majority and dissent regarding the Morse decision and its applicability 
in this case). 
14. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 2354 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70–71 (2012); Lab’y Corp. v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
187–88 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972). 
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and function of how an inventor claimed in a patent what was one’s 
invention. Second, once this legal context is established, it then fails to 
account for how Chief Justice Taney did not follow this settled legal 
practice in patent law in the Antebellum Era, even given the evolving, 
embryonic nature of U.S. patent law in the early nineteenth century. 
In sum, there is a profound misunderstanding of the denouement of the 
“Telegraphic War in the West” in Chief Justice Taney’s Morse opinion 
in 1854.15 
In reviewing rediscovered primary source materials, including the 
Supreme Court’s case record for Morse, this article places Chief Justice 
Taney’s Morse opinion within its proper historical and legal context. 
First, it describes the conventional wisdom that Morse was a would-be 
monopolist who attempted to aggrandize to himself telecommunications 
technologies far beyond the electro-magnetic telegraph he invented in 
the 1830s. Second, it details the early nineteenth-century legal practice 
in patent law in which patent claims secured the essential “principle” 
of an invention, as distinguished from the peripheral claims today that 
define the boundaries of the property right in an invention. Once this 
legal context is established, it is clear that Morse’s patents on the 
electro-magnetic telegraph followed this legal practice in securing the 
principle of his invention. This article identifies this as “principle 
claiming,” as opposed to the anachronistic label of “central claiming” 
used by lawyers today. Third, it identifies how principle claims were 
asserted in patent infringement cases in the Antebellum Era, and how 
Morse again followed these practices. Finally, the Article concludes by 
identifying the legal, historical, and political evidence, including related 
telegraph patent cases decided by Supreme Court Justices and other 
patent cases, such as Winans v. Denmead,16 in showing how Chief 
Justice Taney departed from legal norms in invalidating Claim Eight 
of Morse’s patent. The historical and legal record suggests that judicial 
opportunism, not inventor opportunism, may be the real lesson of 
Morse. 
I. Morse Today: Samuel Morse as 
Telecommunications Monopolist 
Morse is more famous today for his invention of a telegraphic 
transmission code—the dots and dashes known as Morse Code—than 
for his invention of the electro-magnetic telegraph. The simplicity of 
both Morse Code and the components comprising his electro-magnetic 
telegraph were innovative achievements that complemented each other, 
 
15. Steven P. Brown, John McKinley and the Antebellum Supreme 
Court: Circuit Riding in the Old Southwest 215 (2012). The lawsuit 
against O’Reilly was filed in Kentucky, which, in the 1840s, was a western 
state in the fledgling United States.  
16. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854). 
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producing the first functional and successful telegraphic system for 
transmitting information over long distances. The fruits of Morse’s 
inventive labors were an advance over competing telegraph systems 
consisting of either complicated machines that malfunctioned or 
complicated signaling systems that were slow and prone to errors, none 
of which were desirable features for a long-distance communications 
system.17 What Morse invented and what he described and claimed in 
his patent as his invention are not necessarily the same thing, and this 
is the crux of Morse and the narrative today—Morse’s failure was one 
of law and policy, not of his rightful claim as the inventor of the electro-
magnetic telegraph he developed in his tenement in New York City in 
the 1830s. 
Chief Justice Taney is clear in Morse that the problem is Claim 
Eight in Morse’s patent. Chief Justice Taney affirms in a single sentence 
Morse’s first seven claims,18 including Claim Five, which covered 
Morse’s invention of the binary, dot-and-dash communication language 
eponymously identified as Morse Code. It is Claim Eight that becomes 
the subject of Chief Justice Taney’s focus in Morse. It is the only claim 
that he quotes in the opinion: 
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery 
or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and 
claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive 
power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-
magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new 
 
17. See The Comm. on Sci. and the Arts, Report on Prof. Morse’s Electro-
Magnetic Telegraph, 25 J. Franklin Inst. 106, 108 (1938) (“[T]he idea of 
using electro-magnetism for telegraphic purposes has presented itself to 
several different individuals, and . . . it may be difficult to settle among 
them the question of originality. . . . But the plan of Professor Morse is, so 
far as the committee are informed, entirely different from any of those 
devised by other individuals, all of which act by giving different directions 
to magnetic needles, and would therefore require several circuits of wires 
between all the stations. . . . The advantages [are] . . . . that the signals 
may be given at night and in rains, snow, and fogs, when other telegraphs 
fail.”); The English and American Telegraphs, N.Y. Observer & Chron., 
June 7, 1845, at 92 (“The Telegraph (Wheatstone’s) is really as pretty a 
failure as I ever saw. Positively it requires an hour for them to transmit a 
sentence which you could transmit in [sic] in five minutes. The Telegraph 
works by the deflection of two needles, and they deflect so slowly, that the 
letters can scarcely be read at all. They use five wires, each composed of 
three smaller ones twisted together. Now I cannot perceive what is gained 
by this. In my opinion there is a loss.”). 
18. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1854) (“We perceive no well-
founded objection . . . to his right to a patent for the first seven inventions 
set forth in the specification of his claims.”). 
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application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor 
or discoverer.19 
Chief Justice Taney’s negative reaction is palpable. “It is impossible 
to misunderstand the extent of this claim,” he writes.20 He further 
explains: 
[Morse] shuts the door against inventions of other persons . . . . 
For he says he does not confine his claim to the machinery or 
parts of machinery, which he specifies; but claims for himself a 
monopoly in its use, however developed, for the purpose of 
printing at a distance. . . . The court is of opinion that the claim 
is too broad, and not warranted by law.21 
His condemnation of Morse as a would-be monopolist whose too-
broad Claim Eight encompassed within his legal control more than 
what he had invented has been the patent law equivalent of the face 
that launched a thousand ships. It is the foundation for the rule in 
patent eligibility doctrine that inventors may not receive a patent on 
an abstract idea,22 which has been applied in recent years in hundreds 
of cases in which hundreds of patent claims have been invalidated.23 
Some judges and scholars argue that Morse was not applying the 
legal rule prohibiting the patenting of abstract ideas. Rather, they 
contend that Chief Justice Taney’s concern about a claim being “too 
broad” meant that Morse did not effectively describe and teach others 
how to make and use all of the inventions covered by Claim Eight.24 
 
19. Id. (quoting U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (issued June 13, 1848)). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 113. 
22. See Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 927 F.3d 1333, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc) (referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morse as “the 
foundation of the Court’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility”); see also Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 85 (2012) 
(“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of 
nature.” (citing Morse, 56 U.S. at 113)); Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: 
The Intellectual Origins of American Intellectual Property, 
1790–1909, at 284 (2016) (referencing “[t]he celebrated Morse decision, the 
epitome of the great maxim of unpatentability of natural principles”). 
23. See Robert Sachs, Alice: Benevolent Despot or Tyrant? Analyzing Five 




24. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113; see, e.g., Kieff et al., supra note 10, at 155–56 
(labeling O’Reilly v. Morse as an enablement case). 
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This separate view of Morse is a distinction without a difference. 
Regardless whether Morse is viewed as precedent for enablement 
doctrine or patentable eligibility doctrine, the major premise is the 
same: the case was correctly decided. All agree that Morse was 
attempting to monopolize in his patent the field of electronic 
telecommunications far beyond what he had actually invented himself. 
The conventional wisdom about Morse—Morse as monopolist—is 
usually framed in one of two ways. On the one hand, some claim that 
Morse’s “eighth claim would have covered analog and digital data 
transmissions, telephonic and satellite communications—indeed, 
electronic communications of all types.”25 Professors Christina 
Bohannam and Herbert Hovencamp proclaim that “Morse was trying 
to commandeer all future technologies for accomplishing something.”26 
On the other hand, some scholars reject exaggerated allegations about 
the scope of Claim Eight, if only because the express terms used in 
Claim Eight limit it to only telecommunications technologies that 
produce “marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters.”27 
Accordingly, Claim Eight would not cover telephones, radio, 
microwave, or wireless transmissions that produce only auditory sig–
 
25. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 
Va. L. Rev. 305, 323 (1992) (emphasis added). This assertion about the 
scope of Morse’s patent is ubiquitous in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Tun-Jen 
Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 1211, 1252 (2012) (“Samuel Morse did not invent the idea of using 
electric current in telegraphs, and his claim to that was denied.”); Krysta 
Kauble, Patenting Everything Under the Sun: Invoking the First Amendment 
to Limit the Use of Gene Patents, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1123, 1167 (2011) (“In 
effect, awarding Morse a patent over electromagnetic waves could have 
stalled any innovation based on the telegraph for twenty years, possibly 
delaying the invention of the telephone, cellular telephone, text mess–
aging and so on—unless Morse altruistically granted other scientists the 
ability to research electromagnetic waves.”); Nicholas Robinson, Patenting 
the Tax Code: Monopolizing Basic Tax Strategy, 5 Buff. Intell. Prop. 
L.J. 50, 62 (2007) (stating that Morse’s patent would “have granted him a 
monopoly on virtually all electronic communication”); Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice 
in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 Akron L. Rev. 299, 321 
(2005) (“Morse’s eighth claim would have covered, among other 
things, telephone, radio, television, microwave, wireless, and Internet 
communication . . . .”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 850 (1990) 
(“In essence, Morse declared ownership of all methods of communicating at 
a distance using electromagnetic waves.”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 320 (1988) (noting that Morse 
attempted to “monopolize the general idea of using galvanic current for long-
distance communications”). 
26. Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation 
and Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 954 (2010). 
27. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (issued June 13, 1848). 
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nals.28 But they still conclude that Morse’s patent would cover fax 
machines, email, text messages, and other modern telecommunications 
technologies that produce written results, and which Morse certainly 
did not invent.29 Thus, both arguments accept to varying degrees Chief 
Justice Taney’s characterization in Morse of the unjustified, unlimited 
breadth of Claim Eight. 
Both arguments about the scope of Morse’s Claim Eight are 
mistaken. Since lawyers and judges have had access to only Chief 
Justice Taney’s Morse opinion, it is an understandable mistake. Even 
courts in the late nineteenth century adopted the same mistaken 
interpretation given their own limited access to only the Morse 
opinion.30 
 
28. See Merges & Duffy, supra note 6, at 112 (quoting Claim 8).  
29. See, e.g., Bracha, supra note 22, at 268 (Morse’s Claim 8 “would ensnare 
telegraph designs significantly different from Morse’s . . . . Here was an 
attempt to patent a ‘principle,’ if there ever was one.”); Sean B. Seymore, 
The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 660 (2010) 
(asserting that “text messaging . . . clearly falls within the scope of Morse’s 
claim”); Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 Geo. Mason 
L. Rev. 57, 104 (2011) (stating that Morse “claimed all forms of printed 
communication by any electromagnetic signal”); Jacob Adam Schroeder, 
Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 63, 73 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“In 
O’Reilly, after Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, he attempted to claim 
the exclusive right not only to his own invention, but to all devices using 
electricity to print characters at a distance. This was, in fact, the scope of 
claim 8 of his patent.”); William Michael Schuster, Predictability and 
Patentable Processes: The Federal Circuit’s In Re Bilski Decision and Its 
Effect on the Incentive to Invent, 11 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 
(2009) (“[A]ny future invention that used electromagnetism to communicate 
characters or symbols would fall within the ambit of Morse’s eighth claim.”); 
Shawn McDonald, Patenting Floppy Disks, or How the Federal Circuit’s 
Acquiescence has Filled the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 Va. J.L. & 
Tech. 9, para. 17 (1998) (“Yet, because a fax machine electro-magnetically 
transmits text over a distance it would infringe Morse’s claim 8.”); Pamela 
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory 
L.J. 1025, 1056 n.100 (1990) (“His famous eighth claim was for all uses 
of electromagnetism to communicate intelligible characters at a dis–
tance . . . .”); see also CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 
1280–81 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that “Samuel Morse’s broadest claim was rejected 
for undue breadth because it was directed to ‘the use of the motive power of 
the electric or galvanic current . . . for making or printing intelligible 
characters, letters or signs, at any distances’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Morse, 56 U.S. at 86)). 
30. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas. 880, 885 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1871) (No. 
11,899) (repeating the conventional wisdom that Morse was aggrandizing 
to himself control over technologies that he did not invent). 
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They are correct, though, as a matter of patent policy: Morse could 
not legitimately claim, either morally or legally, exclusive control over 
modern email or fax technologies based on his invention in the 1830s of 
a machine that made only tic marks using electricity and magnetism. 
No person should receive a patent covering something that one has not 
invented.31 From the beginning of the U.S. patent system, this has been 
a foundational legal requirement that has distinguished property rights 
in inventions from monopoly grants in commercial enterprises.32 Thus, 
when Chief Justice Taney decries Claim Eight as “too broad” and that 
it “shuts the door against inventions of other persons,”33 he is applying 
a core policy in patent law. 
To understand why the Morse opinion was not necessarily an 
exemplar of this patent policy, one must first understand the nature of 
patents, patent law, and patent litigation in the Antebellum Era, which 
differed fundamentally from how patents are drafted by modern lawyers 
and interpreted by courts today. Given these differences in both law 
and the practices of legal elites, revisiting this historical context can 
feel like the equivalent of visiting a foreign country despite it still being 
a description of U.S. law, institutions, and norms. In fact, this is what 
makes the Morse anachronism possible, because the use of the same 
language can make it appear that earlier jurists, commentators, and 
 
31. See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) (Story, 
Circuit Justice) (“No person is entitled to a patent under the act of congress 
unless he has invented some new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, not known or used before.”). 
32. See, e.g., Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1874) 
(No. 1,434) (Swayne, Circuit Justice) (“Inventors are a meritorious class of 
men. They are not monopolists in the odious sense of that term. They take 
nothing from the public. They contribute largely to its wealth and comfort. 
Patent laws are founded on the policy of giving to them remuneration for 
the fruits, enjoyed by others, of their labor and their genius. Their patents 
are their title deeds, and they should be construed in a fair and liberal spirit, 
to accomplish the purpose of the laws under which they are issued.”); Allen 
v. Hunter, 1 F. Cas. 476, 477 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225) (McLean, Circuit 
Justice) (“Patentees are not monopolists. . . . No exclusive right can be 
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or discovered. . . . 
[T]he law repudiates a monopoly. The right of the patentee entirely rests on 
his invention or discovery of that which is useful, and which was not known 
before. And the law gives him the exclusive use of the thing invented or 
discovered, for a few years, as a compensation for ‘his ingenuity, labor, and 
expense in producing it.’”); Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1833) (No. 326) (Story, Circuit Justice) (“Patents for inventions are 
not to be treated as mere monopolies odious in the eyes of the law, and 
therefore not to be favored; nor are they to be construed with the utmost 
rigor, as strictissimi juris. . . . Hence it has always been the course of the 
American courts . . . to construe these patents fairly and liberally, and not 
to subject them to any over-nice and critical refinements.”). 
33. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
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lawyers are applying the same legal concepts as today. But they were 
not. It is time to recover what Morse meant in yesteryear, which is not 
what it means today. 
II. A Claimed Principle in Antebellum Patents              
and in Morse 
Chief Justice Taney’s laser-like focus on Claim Eight—to the 
exclusion of both the prior seven claims and the written description—
seems correct to modern patent lawyers and scholars because this is the 
basic method of asserting and interpreting claims in patent infringe–
ment cases today.34 This was not the practice among judges, lawyers, 
or commentators in the Antebellum Era. In fact, it was contrary to U.S. 
patent law at that time to construe an individual patent claim in 
isolation from the rest of the patent document, including the other 
patent claims and the specification.35 This Part explains claiming 
practices in Antebellum Era patent law and how Morse followed these 
legal rules and practices in his patents. This historical and legal context 
is necessary to understand both Morse’s patent and his litigation 
against O’Reilly. 
 
34. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (“An infringement analysis involves two steps. First, the court 
determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then 
the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing 
device.” (citations omitted)); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 
F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“The written description part of 
the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the 
function and purpose of claims.”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
35. See Brooks v. Fiske, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 212, 215 (1854) (“The claim, or 
summing up, however, is not to be taken alone, but in connection with 
the specification and drawings; the whole instrument is to be construed 
together.”); George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of 
Patents for Useful Inventions 322 (2d ed. 1854) (stating that an 
infringement “is a copy of the thing described in the specification of the 
patentee, either without variation, or with only such variations as are 
consistent with its being, in substance, the same thing”); William Redin 
Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 Mich. L. 
Rev. 755, 760 (1948) (“[T]he courts for a long time did not regard the 
particular formulations chosen by the inventor to express his claim and 
distinguish his invention from the prior art as the definitive measure of 
the scope of the patent. Rather, the whole patent document, including the 
claims as a guide, was to be viewed to ascertain the scope and nature of 
the invention and to determine whether the invention was embodied in 
the defendant’s practices or devices . . . .”). 
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A. Claiming the Principle of an Invention in Early U.S. Patent Law 
Today, patent claims define the “metes and bounds” of the property 
right.36 These are now known as peripheral claims. In suing someone for 
patent infringement, patent owners today identify the specific point of 
trespass by the defendant—the individual claim or claims.37 Courts thus 
compare this specific claim to the accused infringing product or process 
to determine if patent infringement has occurred. This basic method–
ology in construing individual patent claims in patent infringement 
cases presupposes the modern practice of peripheral claiming in patents. 
In the Antebellum Era, however, the nature and function of a 
patent, including its claims, was to secure “the principle” of an 
invention, not the boundaries of the property right in the invention.38 
Today, lawyers call this “central claiming,” to distinguish it from the 
modern practice of peripheral claiming.39 This label is an anachronism. 
“Central claiming” was not the term used by lawyers, courts, or 
commentators in the Antebellum Era. We should use the term they 
used: patents secure the principle of an invention. 
Accordingly, patent claims in the early nineteenth century set forth 
the essence or principle of the novel, useful invention that was justly 
secured by the patent system.40 The patent statutes mandated that 
inventors do this. The 1836 Patent Act, repeating the same language 
from the 1793 Patent Act, required that the patent specification, 
including the claims, contain “a written description of his invention or 
discovery, . . . [in which] he shall fully explain the principle and . . . 
that principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other 
inventions.”41 Inventors and their lawyers followed the letter of the 
 
36. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 
1687, 1693 (2013) (discussing judicial practice of referring to patent claims 
as the “metes and bounds” of the property right). 
37. See id. (discussing how courts refer to patent infringement as a “trespass”). 
38. See Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1279, 1296 
(2012) (“Most early cases stating that ‘principles’ are not patentable were 
not patentable subject matter opinions; instead, they were attempts to 
determine what the patent covered.”). 
39. See Janice M. Mueller, Patent Law 87 (5th ed. 2016) (“The develop–
ment of claiming practice in the United States reflects a shift from a 
historical central claiming regime to the current system of peripheral 
claiming.”). 
40. See Stephenson v. Hoyt, 22 F. Cas. 1303, 1305 (C.C.D.C. 1854) (No. 13,376) 
(Morsell, Circuit Judge) (“Whatever that principle is, he has certainly a 
right to be protected in the enjoyment of it after it has become secured to 
him by a patent.”). 
41. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870) (emphases 
added); accord Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22 (repealed 
1836). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Claiming a “Principle” in Antebellum Era Patent Law 
746 
law.42 Unsurprisingly, judges applied this statutory mandate in 
construing patents and in instructing juries on liability for infringement 
(or in finding infringement when they sat in equity if the patent owner 
requested an injunction).43 This historical and legal context in early 
U.S. patent law should be acknowledged and respected; thus, we should 
refer to these early claiming practices as principle claiming. 
The legal practice in claiming the “principle” of an invention in 
early American patents—a legal term of art that was differentiated from 
an abstract principle or law of nature that was unpatentable44—was 
well established by the time Morse was decided in 1854. Justice George 
T. Curtis’s famous 1849 patent law treatise devoted over sixty pages to 
explaining the distinction between a patentable “principle” and an 
unpatentable abstract principle.45 Another treatise published in 1853 
instructed inventors and patent lawyers on how to draft a patent to 
secure “the principle” of the invention, explaining that a broad claim is 
entirely proper when “the invention is new in principle” such “that the 
claim may be made as large as possible, so as to prevent any adaptions 
of the principle by different machinery.”46 In discussing the novelty 
requirement, this treatise states that “[t]he person who suggests the 
 
42. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X1865 (granted Jan. 12, 1813) (“The characteristic 
principle . . . is . . . that temper given to steel for a proper spring.”). 
43. See, e.g., Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979, 984–85 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 
10,662) (“What is the principle of the improvement invented by the 
plaintiff? . . . If a defendant adopts a different mode of carrying the same 
principle into effect, . . . there is an identity of principle . . . . [I]t suffices if 
the principle has been pirated.”); Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617–
18 (C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1,506) (Nelson, Circuit Justice) (instructing a 
jury that “in his specification, the patentee explains the principle embodied 
in his machine, in other words, the novel characteristics or inventive 
elements of the machine”); Curtis, supra note 35, at 321 (“Learned judges 
have often laid it down that, where two things are the same in principle, 
the one is an infringement upon the other.”). 
44. See Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047) 
(Story, Circuit Justice) (“In the minds of some men, a principle means an 
elementary truth, or power . . . . No one, however, in the least acquainted 
with law, would for a moment contend, that a principle in this sense is the 
subject of a patent . . . . The true legal meaning of the principle of a 
machine, with reference to the patent act, is the peculiar structure or 
constituent parts of such machine.”); Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 
1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601) (Story, Circuit Justice) (“By 
the principles of a machine, (as these words are used in the statute) is not 
meant the original elementary principles of motion, which philosophy and 
science have discovered, but the modus operandi, the peculiar device or 
manner of producing any given effect.”). 
45. See Curtis, supra note 35, at 84–124. 
46. John Paxton Norman, A Treatise on the Law and Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions 74–75 (1853). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
Claiming a “Principle” in Antebellum Era Patent Law 
747 
principle is the first and true inventor.”47 Of course, it also recognized 
as bedrock patent law that “[a] patent cannot be obtained for an 
abstract philosophical principle.”48 
It is impossible to understand either Morse’s patents on his electro-
magnetic telegraph, Morse’s litigation against O’Reilly, or Chief Justice 
Taney’s Morse opinion without first situating these legal documents 
and practices within these legal norms of early U.S. patent law. At this 
time, a patent secured the principle of an invention—as evidenced by 
the written description and the claims—and defendants were accused 
in court of infringing this principle. Thus, early nineteenth-century 
courts construed the “principle” of the invention as represented by the 
entire patent and applied this principle to the allegedly infringing 
product or process.49 To wit, modern patent lawyers and judges must 
strip away the anachronism that infects the current citations and 
discussions of Morse. When modern judges focus on individual claims 
asserted by lawyers in infringement actions, this is predicated on 
peripheral claiming practices today. Morse’s patents and his litigation 
against O’Reilly were predicated on the legal rules and practices of 
principle claiming—confirming that what Chief Justice Taney does in 
Morse in focusing only on Claim Eight was not legally valid. 
B. Morse Used Principle Claiming in His Patents                                
to Secure His Invention 
Morse first conceived of his electro-magnetic telegraph during an 
ocean voyage from Paris to New York City in 1832.50 He perfected his 
invention throughout the 1830s with the first of his many patents on 
electro-magnetic telegraphy issuing on June 20, 1840.51 His electro-
magnetic telegraph represented a seminal breakthrough given its 
 
47. Id. at 47. 
48. Id. at 8. Norman also identifies that this can be asserted as an affirmative 
defense: “That the invention is not a manufacture within the statute. This 
seems the proper plea to raise the objection so often made unsuccessfully, 
that the patent is for a principle.” Id. at 167 (citations omitted). 
49. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) 
(Story, Circuit Justice) (surveying the entire patent and evaluating its two 
claims explicitly by reference to the specification in assessing its validity). 
50. See 2 Samuel F.B. Morse: His Letters and Journals 6–8 (Edward 
Lind Morse ed., 1914) (depicting three sketches from Morse’s notebook from 
the 1832 voyage); see also Deposition of R.C. Morse, Case Record at 255, 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (No. 224) (“Samuel F.B. 
Morse, then returning home from a three years residence in Europe. . . . 
informed us that he had made, during his voyage, an important invention 
which had occupied almost all his attention on ship-board . . . and showed 
us his sketchbook . . . . I distinctly recollect my surprise and delight at the 
announcement of this brilliant invention.”). 
51. See U.S. Patent No. 1,647 (issued June 20, 1840). 
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simplicity in both design and function—it was the epitome of the 
engineer’s “elegant solution.” Other telegraph systems independently 
developed at around the same time that Morse invented and perfected 
his telegraph failed because of their excessive complexity in both 
mechanical design and in their signaling codes.52 It was only Morse who 
fully embraced the simplicity of a single circuit powered by a battery 
that activated an electro-magnet, moving a magnetized armature to 
mark out the dots and dashes of a binary code on a strip of paper.53 
His first patent, U.S. Patent No. 1,647, details all of these elements 
of his electro-magnetic telegraph system. It contains a lengthy 
description of the invention and it concludes with nine claims that 
comprise what Morse refers to as “my invention.”54 Morse’s claims set 
forth the various components and processes of his electro-magnetic 
telegraph, such as Morse Code (Claim 3), the handle for alternately 
activating/deactivating the electrical circuit (Claim 4), and the 
combination of the electro-magnet, the electrical circuit, and the 
recording machinery for “transmitting intelligence by signs and sounds” 
(Claim 8). 
The now-infamous Claim Eight, though, did not exist in 1840. 
Morse created Claim Eight in a second reissue patent (Reissue Patent 
No. 117) that he received from the Patent Office on June 13, 1848.55 
 
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Galvanic Telegraph, 
N.Y. Observer & Chron., Oct. 28, 1837 (describing the complicated 
circuitry and elaborate recoding system used by a competing telegraph 
created by an English inventor, Charles Wheatstone, and concluding that 
the “most perfect code of signals, beyond question, is that of Professor 
Morse”); Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable 
Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line 
Pioneers 36 (1998) (depicting illustration of complicated telegraph 
invented by William Fothergill Cooke and Charles Wheatstone in England); 
Lewis Coe, The Telegraph: A History of Morse’s Invention and 
Its Predecessors in the United States 14–19 (1993) (comparing and 
contrasting “simple” Morse telegraph with “complicated” or “delicate” 
telegraphs invented by Wheatstone, House and Bain). 
53. See David Hochfelder, The Telegraph in America, 1832–1920, at 
74–76 (2012) (describing the efficiencies achieved by Morse’s transmission 
code in permitting compression of information); Kevin G. Wilson, 
Deregulating Telecommunications: U.S. and Canadian Tele–
communications, 1840–1997, at 10 (2000) (“The genius of the Morse 
system was its simplicity and reliability . . . . A key component of the 
system was the code developed by Morse to convert the letters of the 
alphabet into dots and dashes (short and long electrical signals).”). 
54. ‘647 Patent. 
55. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (issued June 13, 1848). This replaced U.S. 
Reissue Patent No. 79 (issued Jan. 15, 1846). The ability of patent owners 
to obtain corrected, “reissue” patents was well established in patent law 
by the 1830s, having been an administrative practice adopted by the 
Patent Commissioner decades earlier, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
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(Reissue Patent 117 was the specific patent that Morse accused O’Reilly 
of infringing, and more on this shortly.) This was his second reissued 
patent on his primary invention, as he had previously received Reissue 
Patent No. 79, which was issued by the Patent Office on January 15, 
1846. Reissue patents were the result of a patent owner surrendering a 
patent back to the Patent Office for correction for defects of expression 
or style that had an unintended substantive effect of impairing the full 
scope of the property right secured to the patent owner.56 A patent 
owner was prohibited from expanding the scope of the patent in a 
reissue patent; the function of a reissue patent was solely to correct 
only formal defects.57 As Morse explained in his complaint against 
O’Reilly, he had received the two reissue patents “on account of defects 
in the specifications which formed parts of the two patents issued.”58 
All three patents were before the U.S. Supreme Court in Morse, as 
they were entered into evidence and formed the basis of depositions and 
legal disputation throughout the litigation between Morse and O’Reilly 
from the complaint filed in the Circuit Court of the District of Kentucky 
in August 1848 all the way up through the denouement of the case in 
1854.59 The significance of the inclusion of all the patents is that they 
reaffirm that Morse followed the basic tenets of principle claiming, as 
was the legal practice of the time. 
 
Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 244 (1832), and ultimately 
codified by Congress in the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 13, 5 Stat. 117, 
122 (repealed 1870). 
56. See Kendall J. Dood, Pursuing the Essence of Inventions: Reissuing 
Patents in the 19th Century, 32 Tech. & Culture 999, 1001–02 (1991). 
57. See Cahart v. Austin, 4 F. Cas. 997, 1000 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (No. 2,288) 
(Clifford, Circuit Justice) (stating that the reissue right “was intended to 
remedy that evil” in which patents “had frequently been adjudged 
invalid . . . from the insufficiency of the specification,” and thus it was not 
for the purpose “that the patent may be rendered more elastic or 
expansive”); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought 
About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 
92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 1001–03 (2007) (describing the rise of the reissue 
right by administrative fiat at the Patent Office, its validation by the 
Supreme Court in 1832, and the doctrinal limits imposed on it). 
58. Bill of Complaint, Case Record at 4, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
62 (1854) (No. 224). The right of patent-owners to obtain a “reissue 
patent” was first established by the Patent Office without authorization 
under the patent statutes. Mossoff, supra note 57, at 1002. When 
challenged, it was upheld in a unanimous decision in Grant v. Raymond, 
31 U.S. at 244 (Marshall, C.J.). This is just one example of how patents 
were secured by early American courts as civil rights in fundamental 
property rights, which were expansively and liberally construed in favor 
of patentees. See Mossoff, supra note 57, at 1002–04. 
59. See Case Record at 64–87, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
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In the opening paragraphs of Reissue Patent 79, for instance, Morse 
stated that the patent sets forth “a full, clear, and exact description of 
the principle or character” of the “invention I denominate the 
‘American Electro-Magnetic Telegraph.’”60 (It is important to 
remember that, before peripheral claiming, principle claims were 
considered part of the full specification that described the invention.) 
Even more importantly, in both Reissue Patent 79 and Reissue Patent 
117, Morse expressly disclaims “the principle” of his invention adopted 
in Chief Justice Taney’s construction of Claim Eight as encompassing 
all electro-magnetic telegraphy that produces written results at a 
distance. In Reissue Patent 79, Morse wrote that “I do not claim the 
use of the galvanic current or currents of electricity for the purpose of 
telegraphic communication.”61 Similarly, in Reissue Patent 117, the 
actual patent at issue in Morse, he stated right before listing his claims: 
“Having thus fully described my invention, I wish it to be understood 
that I do not claim the use of the galvanic current or currents of 
electricity for the purpose of telegraphic communications generally[.]”62 
Following principle claiming practice at the time, a court must have 
read this disclaimer in construing the meaning of the claims that 
followed. 
Claim One in Reissue Patent 79 was clear about what Morse 
considered to be the principle of his invention: “What I specifically 
claim as my invention and improvement is . . . making use of the 
motive power of magnetism when developed by the action of such 
[galvanic] current or currents, as a means of operating or giving motion 
to machinery.”63 Morse concluded the lengthy and verbose Claim One 
with the following summary statement: 
I therefore characterize my invention as the first recording or 
printing telegraph by means of electro-magnetism. There are 
various known modes of producing motions by electro-magnetism, 
but none of these have hitherto been applied to actuate or give 
motion to printing or recording machinery, which is the chief 
point of my invention and improvement.64 
 
60. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 79 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. He knew that he could not make this claim because he knew of 
experimental work in telegraphy using electricity before his invention, such 
as Dr. Joseph Henry’s experiments at Princeton University in the late 1820s 
in transmitting electricity along great lengths of copper wire that resulted 
in an electro-magnet ringing a bell. See Albert E. Moyer, Joseph 
Henry: The Rise of an American Scientist 67–70 (1997). 
62. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (issued June 13, 1848). 
63. 79 Reissue Patent; Case Record at 68, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
64. 79 Reissue Patent; Case Record at 68, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
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In simple terms: Morse’s invention used electricity to activate an 
electro-magnet, which then caused a metal armature on a machine to 
move, striking a strip of paper and making tic marks on this piece of 
paper (in the form of the dot-and-dash language identified as Morse 
Code). This was the invention he conceived and perfected as a practical 
technology in the 1830s.65 
The claims in Reissue Patent 117 similarly set forth the components 
and processes that comprise the principle of “the first recording or 
printing telegraph by means of electro-magnetism” (as he writes in a 
portion of the lengthy and generalized Claim One).66 The structure of 
Morse’s claims in Reissue Patent 117 is completely alien to modern 
claiming practices. Claim Two through Claim Seven describe the 
specific components or processes comprising his electro-magnetic tele–
graph, such as the mechanical device that marks out the Morse Code 
(Claim Two), the circuit that provides on-and-off pulses of electricity 
to the electro-magnet (Claim Three), Morse Code (Claim Five), and so 
on. In sum, Morse structured his eight claims in Reissue Patent 117 
such that he bookended his claims to the specific machinery, circuits 
and transmission code comprising one embodiment of his invention 
(Claims Two through Seven) with two general claims to the pioneering 
technology of his electro-magnetic telegraph as such (Claim One and 
Claim Eight). This structure of claims makes sense only if the function 
of claims is to set forth the principle of the novel and useful invention. 
The function of these claims in securing the principle of his 
invention is confirmed by Morse and his business associates testifying 
on this point in the litigation before the trial court in Kentucky. In an 
affidavit filed by Leonard Gale, a patent examiner, he stated: “the 
essence or spirit of the invention patented by Samuel F.B. Morse . . . 
consist[s] in a principle carried out in practice,” but, he warned, it must 
be remembered that “the term principle, as used here, cannot be used 
abstractly, but must be considered in connexion [sic] with a result, an 
end, or a practical application.”67 Both Gale and another affiant, 
Charles Page, Chief Examiner at the Patent Office, stated that they 
believed that the “patentable principle” in Morse’s invention is the use 
of an electro-magnet or “inferior electro-magnetic contrivances” to 
operate machinery for the printing of signals.68 This is the “essence of 
 
65. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text; see also Richard R. John, 
Network Nation: Inventing American Telecommunications, chpt. 
2 (2010); Silverman, supra note 3, at 148–50. 
66. 117 Reissue Patent. 
67. Affidavit of Leonard D. Gale, Case Record at 121, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224). 
68. Affidavit of Charles G. Page, Case Record at 127, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224); see also Affidavit of Leonard D. Gale, Case Record at 122, Morse, 56 
U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
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the invention” secured to Morse, and, according to Gale, “is contained 
in the first and last claims” in Reissue Patent No. 117—in Claim One 
and Claim Eight.69 
In addition to Reissue Patent 117 and the preceding patents on the 
electro-magnetic telegraph infringed by O’Reilly, Morse’s patents on his 
other telegraph inventions further confirm he was following principle 
claiming practices in Reissue Patent 117, including in the ill-fated Claim 
Eight. In fact, Morse was drawn into another legal dispute concerning 
whether Alexander Bain could receive a patent for an electro-chemical 
telegraph given these other patents issued to Morse.70 Bain’s and 
Morse’s patents on their respective inventions of an electro-chemical 
telegraph are important for two reasons. 
First, Morse’s additional patents would have been unnecessary if 
Claim Eight had the unbounded scope attributed to it by Chief Justice 
Taney. In 1846, Morse applied for a new patent (and later received 
another reissue patent) for his invention of an electro-chemical 
telegraph.71 When Morse obtained Reissue Patent 118 on this electro-
chemical telegraph on June 13, 1848, he already had received Reissue 
Patent 117 with the ill-fated Claim Eight. If Claim Eight in Reissue 
Patent 117 covered all telecommunications processes that produced 
written characters at a distance, which would include the use of 
chemical processes to make these marks, then Morse would not have 
incurred the additional expenses in both time and money in securing 
his invention of an electro-chemical telegraph with two entirely separate 
patents (Patent 4,453 and Reissue Patent 118). In sum, consistent with 
his principle claims and his express disclaimers in his patents on his 
electro-magnetic telegraph, Morse obtained separate patents for his 
invention of an electro-chemical telegraph. 
Second, and even more important, Reissue Patent 118 on the 
electro-chemical telegraph contained even stronger disclaimers than 
those found in Morse’s patents on the electro-magnetic telegraph. Since 
this patent secured the principle of using electricity to produce written 
 
69. Affidavit of Leonard D. Gale, Case Record at 121–22, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 
(No. 224). 
70. See Bain v. Morse, 2 F. Cas. 394, 403 (C.C.D.C. 1849) (No. 754). When 
Bain filed an appeal in federal court contesting the administrative decision 
by the Patent Office rejecting his patent application given Morse's patents 
on this telegraph technology, his lawsuit was deemed to be an Article III 
equivalent of an interference action. As a result, Morse was listed as a 
defendant in the case. See id. Once more, Morse was required to collect 
and prepare evidence on his inventive activities reaching back to the 
1830s. In Bain, Judge William Cranch held that both Morse’s and Bain’s 
inventions were sufficiently distinct in their technical details and processes 
that they were not the same invention; thus, there was no interference, 
and each could receive their respective patents. See id. at 405, 407. 
71. See U.S. Patent No. 4,453 (issued Apr. 11, 1846). 
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marks without an electro-magnet, Morse stated bluntly in Reissue 
Patent 118 that “I do not, therefore, claim to be the inventor of 
telegraphs generally.”72 He further stated: “I do not, therefore, claim to 
have first applied electricity to telegraphing for the purpose of showing 
evanescent signs or signals.”73 This contradicts the central allegation in 
Morse—that Morse was aggrandizing to himself in Claim Eight all 
electrical telecommunications that produce written marks.74 As with all 
of Morse’s other patents, Reissue Patent 118 was placed into the court's 
records by Morse and thus was before Chief Justice Taney and the 
other Justices on the Supreme Court.75 
III. A Claimed Principle in Antebellum Patent 
Litigation and in Morse 
A. Infringement of a Principle in Antebellum Era Patent Cases 
Given principle claiming in early nineteenth-century patent law, 
patent owners like Morse did not assert that defendants violated a 
specific claim in their patents. Morse’s complaint against O’Reilly, filed 
in the Circuit Court of the District of Kentucky on August 14, 1848, 
does not identify a single patent claim violated by O’Reilly.76 Instead, 
Morse followed legal practices at the time in alleging that O’Reilly and 
his co-defendants “use and employ instruments, apparatus, and means, 
which are in the material, substantial, and essential parts thereof, like 
to and upon the principle and plan of the said several improvements so 
patented by your orator, Morse . . . . All of which is in violation of the 
said several letters patent . . . .”77 
The nature and function of principle claims meant that all patent 
infringement cases in the early nineteenth century represented what 
patent lawyers today call equivalents infringement, which is distinct 
from the core case of patent infringement known today as literal 
infringement.78 Today, equivalents infringement is derivative or secon–
dary to literal infringement, but, in the Antebellum Era, there was no 
literal infringement. Professors John Duffy and Robert Merges point 
out that the “exception to the modern rule [of literal infringement]—
 
72. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 118, Case Record at 81, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224). 
73. Id. 
74. See supra note 29–30 and accompanying text. 
75. See Case Record at 80, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
76. Bill of Complaint, Case Record at 2–20, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
77. Bill of Complaint, Case Record at 11, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (emphasis 
added). 
78. See Mueller, supra note 39, at 615. 
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the doctrine of equivalents—is older than the rule itself.”79 The reason 
is straightforward: principle claiming, not peripheral claiming, was how 
early inventors described their invention in their patent. If Morse’s 
patent claims identified only the principle of his invention, then there 
were no peripheral claims defining the metes and bounds of his property 
right for O’Reilly to literally trespass.80 This is why historical and legal 
context matters in both assessing and using historical patent decisions 
like Morse. 
With principle claims, a patent owner accused a defendant of 
infringing the “substance of this invention” by making, using, or selling 
a product or service representing the “principle” secured by the 
patent.81 In patent infringement cases, courts considered whether the 
defendant violated the “substance” of the invention, looking past 
nonessential mechanical differences or other differences in form from 
the invention described and claimed in the patent.82 Moreover, courts 
did not limit patent owners to the specific mechanical elements and 
other modes of operation detailed in their specification or claims, as 
these were intended to be merely illustrative of the principle of the 
invention itself.83 
 
79. Merges & Duffy, supra note 6, at 811. 
80. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., Foster v. Moore, 9 F. Cas. 563, 567–68 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 
4,978) (Curtis, Circuit Justice) (stating that the “substance of this 
invention” secured to the patentee is not restricted to “the identical devices 
he employed, but by all other known substitutes,” but that the witnesses in 
this case failed to explain the “principle” that is either shared or contrasted 
between the patent and the allegedly infringing device); Roberts v. Ward, 
20 F. Cas. 936, 936 (C.C.D. Mich. 1849) (No. 11,918) (McLean, Circuit 
Justice) (“The word principle, as applied to mechanics, is where two 
machines or things are made to operate, substantially in the same way, so 
as to produce a similar result, they are considered the same in principle.”). 
82. See Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047) 
(Story, Circuit Justice) (“Now, the principles of two machines may be the 
same, although the form or proportions may be different. They may 
substantially employ the same power in the same way, though the external 
mechanism be apparently different.”); see also Norman, supra note 46, at 
108 (“One man has invented the principle and another has adopted it, and 
though he may have carried it into effect by substituting one mechanical 
equivalent for another, still the jury should look to the substance, and not 
the mere form; and if it is in substance an infringement, they ought to find 
it to be so. If its principle is not the same, but really different, then the 
defendants cannot be said to have infringed the patent.”). 
83. See Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1016 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 5,718) 
(Washington, Circuit Justice) (“What constitutes a difference in principle 
between two machines, is frequently a question of difficulty, more especially 
if the difference in form is considerable, and the machinery complicated. 
But we think it may safely be laid down as a general rule, that where the 
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These basic points of how early nineteenth-century courts 
construed patent claims and then applied claims to a defendant’s 
product or process were exemplified in 1839 in Ryan v. Goodwin.84 In 
this case, Justice Story, riding circuit, affirmed the validity of a patent 
on friction matches against several challenges to its validity asserted by 
the defendant, including the challenge that “the claim is too broad to 
support the patent” given that “the inventor has not confined his claim 
to the use of [a specific] chalk, but has extended it to the use of any 
other absorbent earths or earthy materials, which is too general.”85 In 
rejecting this argument, Circuit Justice Story recognized that, first, the 
entire specification, including both the written description and the 
claims, are to be read together as an integrated legal document.86 He 
then stated as a matter of well-established law that “it is observable, 
that the patent act of 1793 (chapter 55) does not limit the inventor to 
one single mode, or one single set of ingredients, to carry into effect his 
invention.”87 Circuit Justice Story, one of the preeminent jurists in U.S. 
patent law, noted that the patent statutes expressly required only that 
“the inventor shall fully explain the principle, and the several modes, 
in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or 
character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions.”88 
 
machines are substantially the same, and operate in the same manner, to 
produce the same result, they must be in principle the same.”). 
84. 21 F. Cas. 110 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 12,186) (Story, Circuit Justice). 
85. Id. at 111–12. 
86. Id. at 112. 
87. Id. The Ryan opinion might appear to give support to Chief Justice Taney's 
interpretation of Claim Eight when Circuit Justice Story says that an 
inventor “may claim as many modes, as he pleases, provided always, that 
the claim is limited to such as he has invented, and as are substantially 
new.” Id. Given that Morse includes an expansive, introductory clause in 
Claim Eight, “I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or 
parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims,” 
supra note 19, he is not limiting his claim to his new invention. But Circuit 
Justice Story begins his legal analysis in Ryan by stating the established 
legal rule that if there is “any ambiguity or uncertainty in any part of the 
specification,” this is not fatal under the law “if taking the whole together, 
the court can perceive the exact nature and extent of the claim made by 
the inventor, it is bound to adopt that interpretation, and to give it full 
effect.” Ryan, 21 F. Cas. at 112. Given the ambiguity in the opening clause 
of Claim Eight concerning what it covered, this required Chief Justice 
Taney to look to Morse’s written description, in which Morse expressly 
disclaims the interpretation adopted by Chief Justice Taney. See supra 
notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
88. Ryan, 21 F. Cas. at 112; see also id. at 113 (“I do not know, that it has 
ever been decided, that, if the claim of an inventor for an invention of a 
compound states the ingredients truly, which the inventor uses to produce 
the intended effect, the suggestion, that other ingredients of a kindred 
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In sum, an inventor claimed the principle of an invention, and thus by 
logical necessity he asserted in a lawsuit only that a defendant infringed 
this principle. 
B. Morse Sought to Secure the Principle of His Invention in  
His Lawsuit Against O’Reilly 
Morse’s complaint in Morse v. O’Reilly followed these established 
legal doctrines in Antebellum Era patent law by asserting that O’Reilly 
infringed “the principle” of his patent.89 This is unsurprising as a matter 
of law. It is also unsurprising simply as a practical matter, because 
O’Reilly defended himself by arguing that the electro-magnetic 
telegraph he used was substantially different from Morse’s patented 
electro-magnetic telegraph. 
O’Reilly knew very well Morse’s patented electro-magnetic tele–
graph because he was originally a licensee of the Magnetic Telegraph 
Company, the company formed in 1845 on the basis of Morse’s patents 
to commercially develop telegraph networks in the U.S.90 The business 
model of the Magnetic Telegraph Company was an early version of a 
franchise business model in which the company licensed territories in 
telegraph networks.91 O’Reilly received a territorial license to build and 
operate a telegraph line between Philadelphia and St. Louis.92 After 
 
nature may be substituted for some part of them, has been held to avoid 
the patent in toto, so as to make it bad, for what is specifically stated.”). 
89. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (quoting Morse’s complaint). 
90. Morse designated Amos Kendall as his patent agent to commercialize his 
electro-magnetic telegraph. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 261. Kendall 
formed the Magnetic Telegraph Company, and he would later write to 
Morse that he had committed his “earthly all . . . in this enterprize, [sic] for 
which I have resigned all other business.” Id. at 261. An 1854 newspaper 
article recounted their relationship with more flourish: “Ten years ago 
Professor Morse was just erecting the first experimental line of 
Telegraphs . . . . Professor Morse, like all scientific benefactors, had 
exhausted his means, and had become as poor as Lazarus, and as lean and 
hungry-looking as any veritable Calvin Edson you ever saw. One day . . . 
Amos Kendall approached him . . . , [and] he gave the dilapidated 
Postmaster General an interest in his Telegraph patent, which has since 
made these two shadows of a shade corpulent with wealth.” Never Despair, 
Loudon Free Press, May 16, 1854, at 1. 
91. See Wilson, supra note 53, at 10 (“Morse and his partners exploited the 
patent through the operations of the Magnetic Telegraph Company, but 
they also licensed the patent for use by other local telegraph companies 
in other regions of the country.”). 
92. See Contract Between Morse & O’Reilly, Case Record at 90, 156–58, 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854) (No. 224). O’Reilly was also 
authorized to run a telegraph line from this primary telegraph line to “to 
the principal towns on the [Great] [L]akes,” and he was expressly prohibited 
from building or operating telegraph lines anywhere else. Id. at 156–58. 
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becoming embroiled in some bitter commercial and legal disputes with 
Morse’s business partners who were running the Magnetic Telegraph 
Company,93 O’Reilly began constructing what he called “The People’s 
Line” between Louisville, Kentucky, and New Orleans, Louisiana, 
which was outside the scope of his license.94 O’Reilly sought to evade 
legal liability by using an allegedly new telegraph, which he called the 
Columbia Telegraph.95 Thus, O’Reilly, like most defendants in patent 
infringement lawsuits, argued that that he was not liable for infringing 
Morse’s patent given essential differences between the Columbia 
Telegraph and the telegraph described and claimed in Morse’s patents. 
Numerous witnesses submitted affidavits or interrogatory responses 
on behalf of O'Reilly in which they ballyhooed two mechanical 
differences between the Columbia Telegraph used on The People’s Line 
and the electro-magnetic telegraph described and claimed in Morse’s 
patent.96 The Columbian Telegraph used two electro-magnets and two 
batteries, as opposed to the single electro-magnet and a single battery 
set forth in Morse’s patent.97 As one witness asserted, the “mode of 
application of electro-magnetism in the two instruments is essentially 
distinct.”98  
93. The battle with O’Reilly began when Francis O.J. Smith, an assignee in 
25% of Morse’s patent, and Amos Kendall, the patent agent and lawyer 
representing Morse’s commercial interests, began a commercial dispute with 
O’Reilly in 1846, which culminated in the filing of the first lawsuit against 
O’Reilly. See Morse v. O’Reilly, 17 F. Cas. 867, 867–68 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1847) 
(No. 9,853). It was captioned with Morse’s name only because it was a 
purported patent infringement lawsuit, even though it was really a lawsuit 
brought by Smith and Kendall. 
94. See Deposition of Thomas C. McAfee, Case Record at 311, Morse, 56 U.S. 
62 (No. 224) (“In the early part of the year 1848, the deft., H. O’Rielly [sic], 
constructed a line of telegraph from Louisville, Kentucky, to Nashville, 
Tennessee . . . . This line of telegraph was called the ‘People’s Line.’”); 
Affidavit of Richard H. Woolfolk, Case Record at 475, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 
(No. 224) (“I state that communication was opened on the ‘People’s line’ of 
telegraph from Louisville to Glasgow on Tuesday, February 22d, 1848.”). 
95. This telegraph was made by Edmund F. Barnes and Samuel K. Zook. See 
Deposition of Samuel K. Zook, Case Record at 378, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224) (“It is proper to say that this ‘Columbian Telegraph’ is the joint 
invention and the joint property of myself and said Barnes, and is called 
the instrument of Barnes & Zook.”). Both Barnes and Zook were employed 
by O’Reilly as telegraphers on The People’s Line. See Deposition of Edmund 
F. Barnes, Case Record at 366–67, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224); Deposition 
of Samuel K. Zook, Case Record at 375, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
96. See Case Record at 94–482, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
97. See, e.g., Deposition of Samuel K. Zook, Case Record at 376–77, Morse, 
56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
98. Deposition of Charles T. Smith, Case Record at 383–84, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 
(No. 224); see, e.g., Deposition of Samuel K. Zook, Case Record at 375–76, 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224); see also Deposition of John C. Cresson, Case 
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Morse’s own bevy of expert witnesses followed the legal doctrine of 
the time in emphasizing that Morse’s patented electro-magnetic 
telegraph and the Columbia Telegraph were essentially the same device 
in principle. They explained that the Columbia Telegraph “is a direct 
infringement of the essence of Morse’s patent and invention, as defined 
in his specification aforesaid, being the same application of the same 
power to the same end. The same form is used, the same result is 
produced, the same general process employed.”99 The experts uniformly 
reported that “[t]here are formal differences between the instruments, 
but no essential difference or difference in principle.”100 The deposition 
transcripts in Morse represent hundreds of pages (typed from the 
handwritten documents of the 1840s), and they consistently state and 
restate the legal rule that, if O’Reilly and his co-defendants were liable 
for patent infringement, it was because the Columbia Telegraph 
 
Record at 391, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“I should consider the 
Columbian Telegraph a distinct instrument from that of Mr. Morse.”); 
Deposition of George W. Benedict, Case Record at 404, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 
(No. 224) (“To my mind the two parts of the Columbian telegraph 
apparatus, namely, the register and the mutator, . . . and the combination 
of the register and mutator makes, as a whole, in my mind, a very different 
machine from the combination seen in the united action of Morse’s register 
and Morse’s receiving magnet.”); Affidavit of Anson Stager, Case Record 
at 472, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“[T]he form or structure, as well as 
the principle or mode of operation, of the said instruments or machines, are 
substantially and mainly different.”). 
99. Deposition of James F. Foss, Case Record at 240, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224). Patent lawyers will immediately recognize that this language comports 
exactly with the “triple identity” test (function-way-result) of the doctrine 
of equivalents. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 
520 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1995). 
100. Deposition of Jacob Walter, Case Record at 306, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 
224); see also Deposition of Charles T. Chester, Case Record at 245, 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (stating that there is only “a slight difference 
in the mechanical structure” and that the “essential principles of the two 
produc[e] the same result”); Deposition of John Torry, Case Record at 
289, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“It will at once be perceptible [sic], from 
the descriptions and drawings of the two instruments, that there is a 
difference in the arrangement and mechanical structure of Barnes and 
Zook’s instrument [the Columbia Telegraph]. It however produces the 
same result as the instrument of Morse, and by the same means, to wit, 
that of electro-magnetism.”); Deposition of Edward N. Kent, Case Record 
at 322, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“[T]he essential principles in Barnes 
and Zook’s instrument are precisely the same as in Morse’s, and that both 
produce the same results and upon the same principles; and the essential 
principles of Morse’s instrument, as patented, is involved in that of Barnes 
and Zook.”). 
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represented “the principle” of the invention described and claimed in 
Morse’s patent.101 
Ultimately, Judge Monroe concluded that Morse’s patent was valid 
and he found O’Reilly and his associates to be liable for patent 
infringement. He issued a court order converting the preliminary 
injunction he had already issued several months earlier into a perm–
anent injunction prohibiting any use of the Columbia Telegraph.102 
Judge Monroe’s decision confirms the accepted legal practice among 
lawyers and judges in the Antebellum Era in construing and in applying 
the principle of an invention set forth in the entire specification of a 
patent—the written description and all the claims. Chief Justice 
Taney’s singular focus on Claim Eight in isolation from everything else 
in Morse’s patent was largely an unknown practice to inventors and 
lawyers in drafting patents, to lawyers in enforcing patents, and to 
judges in interpreting and applying patents. 
 
101. The lengthy sixty-question interrogatories submitted by Morse’s attorneys 
asked such questions as whether “the essential principles of the instrument 
of [defendants] are the same as those of Morse’s instrument” (Question 26) 
and whether “the two instruments produce the same or different results 
upon the same or different principles” (Question 27). Case Record at 171, 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). Similarly, O’Reilly defended himself with 
witnesses who testified as to how his infringing telegraph was “essentially 
different” from that of Morse’s telegraph. Deposition of Edmund F. Barnes, 
Case Record at 365, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224); Deposition of Samuel K. 
Zook, Case Record at 375–76, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“I believe myself 
to be perfectly familiar with the operations of each [telegraph], and the 
principles governing them, and from I know of the two, I believe them to 
differ essentially.”). 
 In response, the witnesses’ testimony consistently reflected this norm of 
patent law in the Antebellum Era. See Deposition of Andrew Prosch, Case 
Record at 223, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (stating that the Columbia 
Telegraph works “for the same purpose, producing the same effect” as 
Morse’s telegraph); Deposition of James F. Foss, Case Record at 238, 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“I unhesitatingly express the opinion that the 
essential principles involved in the instrument of Barnes & Zook are the 
same as in those of Professor Morse. . . . They produce the same results 
upon the same principles, and not different.”); Id., Case Record at 240 
(“The same form is used, the same result is produced, the same general 
process employed.”); Deposition of Charles Chester, Case Record at 245, 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224) (“There is no difference in the nature of Barnes 
& Zook’s instruments from those of Morse. The essential principles of the 
two producing the same result, altho[ugh] there is a slight difference in the 
mechanical structure, but none which changes the nature and principles of 
Morse’s instruments.” (alteration in original)). 
102. Decree, Case Record at 42, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
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C. The Motivation and Meaning of Claim Eight in Morse’s  
Reissue Patent 117 
One might still maintain that the practice of principle claiming in 
patents and in patent litigation in the Antebellum Era is irrelevant to 
Claim Eight and its invalidation by Chief Justice Taney for one simple 
reason: Morse explicitly stated in Claim Eight that it stands alone. 
Morse wrote in the opening clause of Claim Eight: “I do not propose to 
limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery described 
in the foregoing specification and claims . . . .”103 Regardless of whether 
one is a textualist or a purposivist in legal interpretation, this text is 
clear and unambiguous on its face. Or is it? Once again, the similarities 
in legal language from a bygone historical era can obscure significant 
differences in legal practices. 
As noted earlier in describing how Morse followed principle claiming 
practices in his patents,104 Reissue Patent 117 had eight claims. The 
claims are bookended by two generalized descriptions of the essence of 
his invention (Claims One and Eight) with the specific mechanical 
components and processes used in his electro-magnetic telegraph 
covered by the middle claims (Claims Two through Seven). Claim One 
is thus a broadly framed and generalized description of the essence of 
Morse’s his invention, but Claim One does not contain the fateful clause 
that introduces Claim Eight. 
The lengthy and generalized descriptions in both Claim One and 
Claim Eight were not in the original Patent 1,647 that issued to Morse 
in 1840. Of course, the information was in his original patent: it was in 
the specification, not in the claims.105 Inventors were prohibited from 
 
103. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 117 (issued June 13, 1848). 
104. See supra notes 54–75, and accompanying text. 
105. The first paragraph of his original patent that issued in 1840 stated: 
 Be it known that I, the undersigned, Samuel F.B. Morse, 
of the city, county and State of New York, have invented a new 
and useful machine and system of signs for transmitting intelligence 
between distant points by the means of a new application and effect 
of electro-magnetism, in producing sounds and signs, or either, and 
also for recording permanently by the same means, and application, 
and effect of electro-magnetism any signs thus produced and 
representing intelligence, transmitted as before named between 
distant points A, and I denominated the said invention the 
American Electro-Magnetic Telegraph, of which the following is a 
full and exact description to wit. 
 Patent No. 1,647, reprinted in Schedule, Case Record at 53, Morse, 56 U.S. 
62 (No. 224). Such language is the portent of Claim Eight, which Morse 
added to his Reissue Patent 117 in 1848. Similarly, Claim Seven in his 
original 1840 patent stated: “The mode and process of recording or marking 
permanently signs of intelligence transmitted between distant points, and 
simultaneously to different points, by the application and use of electro-
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expanding the scope of their patents through the reissue process, which 
was solely for the purpose of correcting formal or stylistic defects that 
accidentally undermined the protection of the principle of the invention 
secured by a patent.106 
Why did Morse take language from the specification and convert it 
into a claim in Reissue Patent 117? We do not have a direct answer, at 
least none yet found in the extant historical record that we have 
reviewed thus far, such as the case record and some of Morse’s papers. 
We still can draw a reasonable inference from what we do know about 
the “Telegraphic War of the West”—Morse’s extensive litigation with 
O’Reilly, the wide-ranging fights in the court of public opinion, and the 
widespread litigation imposed on him by others with legal interests in 
his patents.107 
As Morse struggled over the years with O’Reilly’s and his 
supporters’ public attacks on him as a monopolist,108 with the 
proliferating lawsuits throughout the country,109 and with the expense 
and lost time of these lawsuits,110 he evidently believed that his original 
patent and his first reissue patent did not sufficiently protect the 
principle of his invention. O’Reilly even filed a protest with Congress 
demanding impeachment of Judge Monroe, charging the judge with 
 
magnetism or galvanism, as described in the foregoing specification.” Morse, 
56 U.S. at 78 (reprinting the content of the original patent). 
106. See Cahart v. Austin, 4 F. Cas. 997, 1000 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (No. 2,288) 
(Clifford, Circuit Justice) (stating that the reissue right “was intended to 
remedy that evil” in which patents “had frequently been adjudged 
invalid . . . from the insufficiency of the specification,” and thus it was 
not for the purpose “that the patent may be rendered more elastic or 
expansive”); Mossoff, supra note 57, at 1001–02 (describing the rise of the 
reissue right by administrative fiat at the Patent Office, its validation by 
the Supreme Court in 1832, and the limits imposed on it). 
107. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
108. In one of his many public pamphlets, O’Reilly attacked Morse and his 
business associates for creating a “monopoly” that stood in the way of 
“Equal Rights to all modes of Telegraphing.” See Silverman, supra note 
3, at 285–86 (quoting The Wired Party's Song). O’Reilly announced in 
this pamphlet: “We take the strongest Anti-monopoly ground.” Id. at 285. 
One newspaper in Kentucky accused Morse’s patent agent and lawyer, 
Amos Kendall, of being a “venomous reptile,” a “demented old man,” and 
one of “the blood-sucking calves that are hanging on the teats of Morse’s 
monopoly.” Id. at 291–92. 
109. See infra notes 119–138 and accompanying text. 
110. Morse would complain in a letter to his brother that “pirates” like O’Reilly 
and the lawsuits generally have meant that “all my time has been occupied 
in defense, in putting evidence into something like legal shape that I am the 
inventor of the Electro-Magnetic Telegraph!!” Letter from Samuel F.B. 
Morse to Sidney Morse (Apr. 19, 1848), in Morse, supra note 50, at 283. 
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improprieties in his handling of the case.111 O’Reilly further attempted 
to evade liability by moving the facilities for The People’s Line to a 
different judicial circuit—from Kentucky to Ohio—given that the 
injunction issued against him by Judge Monroe was in a federal court 
in Kentucky.112 This precipitated more litigation for contempt 
proceedings.113 Throughout, Morse was repeatedly attacked in court and 
in the press as not being the first inventor of his electro-magnetic 
telegraph, at best, or having stolen the idea, at worst.114 
As a result of the constant public attacks and the growing expense 
and inconvenience of dealing with O’Reilly’s strategic behavior, Morse 
sometimes overreacted and spoke more broadly about his contribution 
to electro-magnetic telegraphy. Thus, for example, he wrote in a letter 
in 1851: “Telegraphic Speech by Electricity, as the principle of my whole 
invention.”115 Statements like this in letters contradicted his express 
disclaimers in his patents, as well as were unsupported by the legal rules 
governing principle claiming, but these sentiments would prove grist for 
the mill leading up to Chief Justice Taney’s decision. 
If read in isolation from the written description and other claims, 
one could think that Morse went too far with his language in Claim 
Eight, as exactly as Chief Justice Taney asserts in Morse. But principle 
claiming was well understood by inventors, lawyers, and judges at the 
time, and claims were not read in isolation from each other. Peripheral 
claiming had not yet developed; thus, claims were not construed and 
applied in isolation from other claims or from the specification. In the 
Antebellum Era, no lawyer drafted a patent claim in isolation from the 
written description. No judge construed patent claims in isolation from 
the written description. 
This point is confirmed by the adjudication of Claim Eight as valid 
in many other infringement cases brought by Francis O.J. Smith, 
 
111. Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836–64, at 491–92 (1974). 
112. See Contempt Order, Case Record at 514, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 62 (1854) (No. 224) for records of the contempt proceedings. 
113. See id. at 513–14. 
114. In his Amended Answer, O’Reilly added the claim that Morse stole his 
invention from Dr. Charles T. Jackson. See Amended Answer, Case Record 
at 35, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224); Deposition of Charles T. Jackson, Case 
Record at 397–98, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224); see also Smith v. Clark, 22 
F. Cas. 487, 487 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,027) (repeating argument that 
Morse got his invention from Dr. Jackson); Silverman, supra note 3, at 
315 (stating that in Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) 
(No. 13,036), “Downing meant to fight back by contesting the validity of 
the patent, using the well-worn testimony of Dr. Charles Jackson” that 
Morse stole the invention from him). 
115. Letter from Samuel F.B. Morse to George Gifford (Jan. 1, 1851), in 
Silverman, supra note 3, at 312. 
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someone to whom Morse had assigned a 25% interest in his patent in 
1838.116 Smith was notoriously obstreperous.117 Unlike Morse, who sued 
only O’Reilly and was later drawn into other legal contests without his 
prompting,118 Smith was very litigious.119 Smith eventually ended up in 
litigation with Morse,120 and he remained true to his rancorous nature 
by attacking the validity of Morse’s patent,121 going so far as to join 
forces with O’Reilly for a brief moment.122 Smith’s reputation for being 
rash was well deserved. If he had been successful in attacking Morse’s 
patent, his legal arguments were entirely self-defeating: If Smith 
invalidated Morse’s patent, then he invalidated his own 25% interest in 
the patent as well. 
Unlike Morse, Smith was willing to sue owners and operators of 
telegraphs that had been independently invented and were significantly 
different from Morse’s electro-magnetic telegraph, such as an electro-
magnetic telegraph patented in 1846 by Royal House.123 O’Reilly himself 
bankrolled House and House ultimately conveyed his patent to 
O’Reilly, but it proved to be another impractical telegraph.124 Thus, 
when Morse sued O’Reilly, he sued him for the Columbia Telegraph, 
and O’Reilly did not argue in his initial defenses that Morse’s patent 
was too broad or covered an abstract idea.125 But Smith was suing 
 
116. See Bill of Complaint, Case Record at 5, Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (No. 224). 
117. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 228 (stating that Smith was accused “of 
double-dealing and chicanery” and bestowed with the title of “Liar, 
Scoundrel, and Coward” even before he met Morse). 
118. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the interference 
proceeding in Morse v. Bain). 
119. A few of the patent infringement lawsuits he filed were Smith v. Downing, 
22 F. Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,036); Smith v. Ely, 22 F. Cas. 
533 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 13,043); Smith v. Clark, 22 F. Cas. 487 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1850) (No. 13,027); and Smith v. Seldon, 22 F. Cas. 652 (C.C.N.D. 
N.Y. 1849) (No. 13,104). 
120. Smith v. Morse, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 76 (1869). 
121. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 316–17. The House telegraph suffered from 
technical problems and was ultimately of no commercial value. See Joshua 
D. Wolff, Western Union and the Creation of the American 
Corporate Order, 1845–1893, at 22 (2013). 
122. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 317. 
123. See, e.g., Clark, 22 F. Cas. at 487 (“House’s machine appears much unlike 
Morse’s . . . . While Morse’s is simple, that of House is so complicated as 
to require days of attention by mechanics to understand. . . . This is not 
the same system as Morse’s . . . .”). 
124. See Silverman, supra note 3, at 284. 
125. See Answer, Case Record at 21–25, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
62 (1854) (No. 224) (asserting that Morse’s patent was “null and void” 
on the basis of a slew of patentability requirements, including that he was 
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telegraph operators using disparate electro-magnetic telegraphs and 
defendants did start to raise this defense. 
In one case, Smith v. Ely, the eighteenth answer by the defendant 
asserted that Morse’s patent in Claim Eight was too broad in claiming 
an abstract principle, which was not one of the categories of patentable 
inventions set forth in the patent statute.126 Unfortunately, neither 
Smith nor the defendants submitted Morse’s patent into evidence by 
which the judge could read the claim and the written description. Thus, 
the judge was unable to assess the veracity of this argument by the 
defendants.127 
In Smith v. Downing, Smith sued another person using the House 
telegraph, and, as in Ely, the defendant alleged that Claim Eight of 
Morse’s patent was invalid for attempting to monopolize the abstract 
principle of telegraphy.128 In considering this defense, Justice Levi 
Woodbury, riding circuit, reviewed the other claims in Morse’s patent, 
and quoted Morse’s explicit disclaimer that “I do not claim the use of 
the galvanic current, or current of electricity, for the purpose of 
telegraphic communications generally . . . .”129 While acknowledging 
that Claim Eight by itself was a “broader claim [that] goes far beyond 
what we have already seen was . . . in the original patent,” he 
recognized that Morse does “disavow it” in the patent and thus he 
concluded that “I do not think it just to place a broader construction 
on his language than the whole subject matter, and description . . . .”130 
 
not the inventor of the telegraph, it was not a novel invention, and the 
specification did not properly describe the invention, among many others, 
but never asserting that any claim was too broad or covered an abstract 
idea). 
126. See Smith v. Ely, 22 F. Cas. 533, 538 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 13,044) 
(“And in the eighteenth plea after stating the above, the defendants aver 
that the thing so ‘patented and claimed, is not any art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any improvement on any art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter,’ &c.”). 
127. Id. (“The patent not being before us, as it would be, if offered in evidence, 
or copied into the declaration or plea, we cannot decide this question.”). The 
judge did not want to imply that he disagreed with defendant’s argument as 
such, which was a valid legal rule, stating that “[i]t may not, however, be 
improper to remark, that a [scientific] principle is not patentable. And ‘the 
motive power of the galvanic current, however developed to produce a given 
result,’ can no more be patented than the motive power of steam to propel 
boats, however applied.” Id. 
128. See Smith v. Downing, 22 F. Cas. 511, 514 (C.C.D. Mass. 1850) (No. 13,036) 
(“As to the second objection, that [Claim Eight] would be seeking to cover, 
by a patent, a new principle, without reference to any mode or method of 
enforcing it, the patent laws are well settled never to permit it.”). 
129. Id. at 513 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 117 (reissued June 13, 1848)). 
130. Id. at 513. 
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While Circuit Justice Woodbury recognized that the “broader view” 
advanced by the defendant would likely make Claim Eight “void, both 
for claiming too much, and for claiming also the invention of a mere 
principle,” he rejected the defendant’s argument because “no fancied 
construction, traveling too far, on a new and doubtful ground, is to be 
adopted” in construing a patent.131 
Later in his Downing opinion, Circuit Justice Woodbury surveyed 
the well-established legal distinction in Antebellum Era patent law 
between a patentable principle applied in a “useful art” and an 
unpatentable “abstract principle.”132 He reiterated his earlier conclusion 
that Morse’s claims, when read together with the specification, confirm 
that Morse properly patented the principle of his invention, and not an 
abstract principle.133 Downing is notable because Circuit Justice 
Woodbury’s analysis of Claim Eight is exactly what one would expect 
a court to do given principle claiming rules and practices in early U.S. 
patent law. Unfortunately, Justice Woodbury died in 1851, the year 
before the Supreme Court held oral argument in O’Reilly’s appeal; 
Morse might have come out differently if Justice Woodbury had lived 
a few more years.134 
With judicial opinions issuing from separate, parallel lawsuits filed 
by Smith in other circuits, O’Reilly eventually adopted the argument 
he did not originally assert against Morse in the lawsuit filed in 
Kentucky—Morse was claiming an abstract principle in Claim Eight. 
After the district court’s decision in Morse’s favor and the award of the 
injunction in Kentucky, Morse and his business associates filed more 
lawsuits and sought injunctions in federal courts along the path of The 
People’s Line in Tennessee, Alabama, and Louisiana. Justice John 
McKinley, riding circuit, presided over these cases, and he similarly 
found O’Reilly liable for patent infringement and issued an injunc–
tion.135 Yet, unlike in the Kentucky case, Circuit Justice McKinley now 
had to respond to O’Reilly’s new argument that Morse was attempting 
to patent an abstract principle.136 He rejected this assertion, explain 
that Morse’s “patent is not for a principle. It is not for electricity or 
electro-magnetism, or their use for all purposes, or even all telegraphic 
purposes; but it is for the application of this power to a specific 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 514. 
133. Id. at 517–18. 
134. See Swisher, supra note 111, at 497 (discussing Justice Woodbury's death 
the year before oral argument began in December 1852). 
135. See Brown, supra note 15, at 216. 
136. Id. 
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purpose.”137 Circuit Justice McKinley pointed concluded that Morse’s 
“claims are not broader than his discovery and invention, and therefore 
his patent is valid.”138 (In another turn of fate for Morse, Justice 
McKinley also died shortly before oral argument was held at the 
Supreme Court in 1852.139) Morse’s patent, including Claim Eight, was 
thoroughly adjudicated and repeatedly affirmed as valid by Justices 
and judges following the rules and practices of principle claiming in the 
Antebellum Era. 
Lastly, beyond the confines of the telegraph cases, other Supreme 
Court patent cases decided at the same time as Morse confirm that 
Morse’s language in Claim Eight was not unusual. In Winans v. 
Denmead,140 decided the same year as Morse, the Supreme Court 
expressly recognized as legitimate the use of non-limiting language in 
claims. The Winans Court stated: “Patentees sometimes add to their 
claims an express declaration, to the effect that the claim extends to 
the thing patented, however its form or proportions may be varied. But 
this is unnecessary. The law so interprets the claim without the addition 
of these words.”141 Given the legal practice of principle claiming, it is a 
distinction without a difference for one patent to use the words that 
the “claim extends to the thing patented, however its form or properties 
may be varied” and for another patent to use the words “I do not 
propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims.” In the context of 
principle claiming, these sentences state the same proposition. 
The doctrinal parallels between Winans and Morse are striking, 
especially given that Winans is another canonical case for the modern 
infringement doctrine of equivalents. In Winans, the inventor claimed 
as the “principle” of his invention a “conical” railway car for the 
“transportation of coal, and all other heavy articles in lumps.”142 The 
defendant built an octagonal railway car, but the Supreme Court held 
that it infringed the “principle” of the claimed invention of a conical 
railway car.143 Justice Benjamin Curtis explained in his opinion for the 
Court that “the patentee, having described his invention, and shown 
its principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly em–
 
137. Id.  
138. Id. For the remedy, Circuit Justice McKinley issued the injunction only for 
the jurisdiction in which he rode circuit, the Eighth Circuit. Thus, O’Reilly 
was enjoined only in Tennessee, and not in Alabama or Louisiana. Id. 
139. See Swisher, supra note 111, at 498.  
140. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854). 
141. Id. at 343. 
142. Id. at 330–31 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,175 (issued June 26, 1847)). 
143. Id. at 340. 
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bodies it, is, in contemplation of law, deemed to claim every form in 
which his invention may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to 
disclaim some of those forms.”144  
In both Morse and Winans, the defendants’ infringing devices were 
different from the patented invention only in “form or proportions,”145 
and both were deemed to be essentially the same in principle. Morse 
even included an express disclaimer that he was not claiming to invent 
telegraphy by electricity as such, per the point made by Justice Curtis 
in Winans that patent owners can do this if they wish to impose a limit 
on the scope of their principle claim(s). The only difference between 
Winans and Morse is that Chief Justice Taney refused to acknowledge 
this express disclaimer in Morse, as other courts had already done, such 
as in Downing. The similarities between Morse and Winans were not 
lost on lawyers and judges at the time, as later cases expressly addressed 
the question of whether Winans overruled Morse (they ultimately held 
it did not).146 
In conclusion, the introductory clause of Claim Eight raised initial 
concerns for some judges in the many improper lawsuits filed by Smith. 
Given the overreach in Smith’s lawsuits, defendants understandably 
argued among many defenses that Claim Eight was overbroad. Yet, the 
judges in these cases and in Morse’s own cases all consistently 
recognized that Morse followed principle claiming practices and 
construed Claim Eight (with the fateful introductory clause) as valid 
when read within the context of his entire specification. Claim Eight 
properly described and secured the principle of Morse’s invention of an 
electro-magnetic telegraph. This is why courts consistently affirmed 
Claim Eight as valid—until Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Morse 
construed Claim Eight in derogation of the legal practices and 
interpretative rules of principle claiming. 
IV. Judicial Opportunism in Morse,                               
Not Inventor Opportunism 
The degree to which Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Morse 
contradicted both the method of interpretation and substantive 
conclusions of many other courts concerning the validity of Claim Eight 
is striking. It is particularly surprising given Morse’s express disclaimers 
in his patents of the exact claim Chief Justice Taney accused him of 
 
144. Id. at 343 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. 
146. See Singer v. Walmsley, 22 F. Cas. 207, 211 (C.C.D. Md. 1860) (“[T]he 
celebrated case of Winans v. Denmead, upon which great reliance has been 
placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff . . . I do not understand it as 
overruling the doctrine in the case of O’Reilly v. Morse, but the court are 
declaring the rules by which you are to be guided on the question of 
infringement . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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making in Claim Eight—control over all electrical telegraphic commun–
ication at a distance. This suggests something else may have been 
motivating Chief Justice Taney. In contrast to other infamous decisions 
by Chief Justice Taney, there is no smoking gun that indicts his Morse 
opinion as animated by his policy preferences as opposed to the legal 
rules and practices of early U.S. patent law. There is, however, 
circumstantial evidence that raises a concern about opportunistic 
behavior by Chief Justice Taney in Morse. This calls into question the 
conventional wisdom today that Morse is a canonical case imposing a 
legitimate legal limit on strategic behavior by an inventor seeking to 
abuse the patent system in becoming a monopolist. 
A. Lack of Legal Support for Chief Justice Taney’s Opinion in Morse 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Morse is not supported by 
Antebellum Era patent law. As noted earlier, the legal practice of 
principle claiming and the interpretation and application of principle 
claims in litigation contrasted sharply with what Chief Justice Taney 
did in Morse, especially in direct comparison to Circuit Justice 
Woodbury’s analysis of Claim Eight in Downing.147 It is notable that 
none of these cases or the express disclaimers in Morse’s patents are 
found in Chief Justice Taney’s constricted analysis of Claim Eight. All 
of Morse’s patents and all of the immediate courts’ decisions were in 
the case record before the Supreme Court, and cases like Downing were 
printed in court reporters and equally well known. The absence of these 
highly relevant legal materials in Morse, all of which were being invoked 
in arguments by lawyers and judges alike in the Great Telegraph Case, 
is a significant omission. 
Chief Justice Taney admittedly did cite some case law to support 
his argument about Claim Eight, but this precedent does not support 
him either. Significantly, he invoked an 1840 decision in Wyeth v. Stone 
by Justice Story, riding circuit,148 stating that Wyeth was “directly on 
point.”149 This was no small claim for legal support. Justice Story was 
recognized as a leading jurist in U.S. patent law given his preeminent 
role in shaping the early U.S. patent system through his numerous 
opinions in patent cases.150 
But Wyeth does not support Chief Justice Taney’s analysis of Claim 
Eight. In fact, it corroborates that Chief Justice Taney’s myopic focus 
on Claim Eight was an aberration in a time period when courts 
 
147. See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text. 
148. 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (Story, Circuit Justice). 
149. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 118 (1854). 
150. See Adam Mossoff, Statutes, Common Law Rights, and the Mistaken 
Classification of Patents as Public Rights, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 2591, 2611 
(2019) (noting Justice Story’s preeminent role in creating U.S. patent law). 
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construed principle claims. Chief Justice Taney's reference to Wyeth is 
understandable because the result in this case was the same as in Morse: 
Justice Story held as “utterly void” one of two claims in a patent given 
his conclusion that it was too broad and encompassed an abstract 
principle.151 But Justice Story did not reach this conclusion by focusing 
only on the single disputed claim; rather, he analyzed both claims in 
the patent and he expressly addressed the inventor's additional 
language and examples in his specification.152 The outcome in Wyeth is 
similar to Morse, but the legal analysis is as different as night and 
day—it is the difference between peripheral claiming today and 
principle claiming in the Antebellum Era. If Justice Story had not 
passed away in 1845,153 just as if Justice Woodbury and Justice 
McKinley had not passed away before oral argument in 1852, Morse 
might have been very different in both its analysis and result. 
Winans, as discussed earlier, provides additional insights into Chief 
Justice Taney’s views of how patents should be interpreted. As noted, 
Winans is significant, because it was decided the same year as Morse. 
Winans more than Morse reflected the legal practices of principle 
claiming by inventors who used “I’m not limited” language in their 
claims, just as Morse did in Claim Eight.154 
Winans provides an insight into what Chief Justice Taney thought 
of Morse’s lawsuit against O’Reilly: he likely believed that Morse should 
have lost his lawsuit against O’Reilly. In Winans, Chief Justice Taney 
joined Justice John Campbell’s dissent.155 In his dissent, Justice 
Campbell decried the problem of unbounded claim scope: “The claim 
of to-day is, that an octagonal car is an infringement of this patent [on 
a conical car]. Will this be the limit to that claim? . . . What restraints 
does this patent impose in this branch of mechanic art?”156 This is the 
exact same concern expressed by Chief Justice Taney in Morse about 
“the extent of this claim” and that its lack of limits “shuts the door 
against inventions of other persons.”157 
Since Chief Justice Taney joined Justice Campbell’s dissent in 
Winans, this suggests that he believed that Morse should have failed in 
his patent infringement lawsuit against O’Reilly. Just as in Winans, 
 
151. Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727. 
152. Id. at 727–28. 
153. See Craig Joyce, Statesman of the Old Republic, 84 Mich. L. Rev 846, 859 
(1986) (noting that “[Justice Story] died . . . on September 10, 1845.”). 
154. See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text. 
155. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 344–48 (1854) (Campbell, 
J., dissenting). 
156. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
157. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–13 (1854). 
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Morse sued O’Reilly for making and using a similar, but not identical, 
electro-magnetic telegraph that infringed the principle of the invention 
described and claimed in Morse’s patent.158 The lower courts found 
O’Reilly liable for making and using a substantially similar electro-
magnetic telegraph.159 
If the equivalents-style argument for infringement of principle 
claims was the same in both Winans and Morse, why then did Chief 
Justice Taney strike down only Claim Eight, affirm the validity of 
Morse’s other seven patent claims, and affirm the liability of O’Reilly 
for patent infringement? Perhaps Chief Justice Taney could not keep a 
majority in making a broader argument that O’Reilly was not liable, as 
evidenced by the fact that he and Justice Campbell were in dissent in 
Winans that same year. This may explain the conclusory, single-
sentence statement by Chief Justice Taney that the first seven claims 
in Morse’s patent are valid and infringed.160 Why Chief Justice Taney 
still advanced the argument in Morse that Claim Eight represented “a 
monopoly in its use, however developed, for the purpose of printing at 
a distance” is the subject of the next section.161 
B. Chief Justice Taney’s Reputation for Policy-Driven  
Judicial Decision-Making 
Chief Justice Taney has a well-established reputation for giving 
priority to his personal policy preferences as a Jacksonian Democrat 
over his judicial duty in construing and applying the law. The monopoly 
charges, as well as the public and legal attacks on Morse’s patent as 
retarding progress in telegraphy, might have found a willing ear in a 
committed Jacksonian Democrat like Chief Justice Taney.162 O’Reilly 
was not exactly subtle in adopting “The People’s Line” tradename in a 
time when the U.S. was still in the throes of the populism of Jacksonian 
Democracy.163 A key political principle of Jacksonian Democracy was a 
deep-seated antipathy toward state-granted franchises and monopolies. 
For example, Chief Justice Taney’s famous decision in Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge164 is widely regarded as “reflect[ing] the 
 
158. Id. at 65; see supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
159. Morse, 56 U.S. at 63.  
160. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112 (“We perceive no well-founded 
objection . . . to his right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth 
in the specification of his claims.”). 
161. Id. at 113. 
162. See supra note 108 (describing the attacks on Morse as a monopolist). 
163. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
164. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
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prevailing anti-monopoly sentiment that was one of the hallmarks of 
the Jacksonian period.”165 
Prominent proponents of Jacksonian Democracy condemned 
patents as unjust monopolies. William Leggett, a famous Jacksonian 
Democrat who was a newspaper editor and commentator, wrote widely 
read essays in which he vociferously “den[ied] that the author and 
inventor have any property in the fruits of their intellectual labor.”166 
In critiquing copyright law, Leggett argued that “the general welfare 
would be advanced by abolishing the principle of exclusive property in 
written compositions.”167 He believed this criticism applied with equal 
force to patents.168 
To be fair, Leggett represented one strand of Jacksonian political 
ideology, and Chief Justice Taney was not an intellectual property 
abolitionist. In mundane patent cases in which core Jacksonian 
Democratic principles were not implicated, such as its fundamental 
commitment to economic populism, Chief Justice Taney applied the 
patent statutes and case law.169 At least, he did so before The Great 
Telegraph Case came to the Taney Court in 1852 by an appeal from 
the owner of The People’s Line explicitly arguing that he was the victim 
of a rapacious monopolist. 
Beyond the limits of patent law, of course, Chief Justice Taney has 
a well-deserved reputation for his “fervent” commitment to his political 
and policy preferences as a Jacksonian Democrat.170 One prominent 
example was his actions as Attorney General in 1833 in violating federal 
law to implement President Jackson’s order to “kill” the U.S. Bank and 
 
165. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relation–
ship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 
553, 592 (1994). 
166. William Leggett, The Rights of Authors, Plaindealer, Feb. 11, 1837, 
reprinted in Democratick Editorials: Essays in Jacksonian Polit–
ical Economy by William Leggett 396, 403 (Lawrence H. White ed., 
1984). 
167. William Leggett, Rights of Property in the Fruits of Intellectual Labor, 
Plaindealer, Feb. 25, 1837, reprinted in Democratick Editorials, 
supra note 166, at 405. 
168. See Leggett, supra note 166, at 401 (“The law of patents rests confessedly 
on the same principle as the law of copyright.”). 
169. See, e.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850) (applying the 
legal rule in patent law that “the discoverer of a new and useful 
improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclusive use, 
which he may perfect and make absolute by proceeding in the manner which 
the law requires”). 
170. See The Oxford Companion to American Law 783 (Kermit L. Hall 
et al. eds., 2002) (discussing Taney’s “fervent” commitment to Jacksonian 
political principles). 
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transfer federal funds to state banks.171 Attorney General Taney and 
then-Postmaster General Amos Kendall—ironically, Morse’s patent 
agent, business partner, lawyer, and co-plaintiff in The Great Telegraph 
Case172—were the only two cabinet officers who agreed to implement 
President Jackson’s illegal order to divest the U.S. Bank of funds and 
transfer the federal monies to state banks.173 
Three years later, President Jackson appointed Taney to the 
Supreme Court to fill Chief Justice Marshall’s seat.174 Taney and other 
Justices appointed by President Jackson were more openly and 
“unabashedly political” than their preceding brethren.175 Chief Justice 
Taney is notorious precisely for his policy-driven decision in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford.176 Dred Scott is universally condemned as a case of “bad 
judicial politics.”177 
Chief Justice Taney demonstrated a willingness to enforce as law 
the anti-monopoly and populist principles of Jacksonian Democracy, 
not just its infamous racism.178 Justice Story dissented in Charles River 
Bridge, detailing at length how Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion 
 
171. See Howe, supra note 2, at 379–83, 441–42 (detailing President Jackson’s 
“attack on the Bank of the United States” and Taney’s explicit violation 
of federal law). These state banks were known as “pet banks” given their 
corruption and cronyism, and Taney was also a lawyer and stockholder of 
one particularly notorious pet bank. Id. at 388, 393. 
172. See supra note 90 (discussing the relationship between Morse and Kendall). 
173. Howe, supra note 2, at 387. For this illegal act, effected and rationalized 
by Taney and Kendall, President Jackson was officially censured by the 
Senate for having “assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred 
by the Constitution and laws.” Id. at 389 (quoting the censure resolution, 
available in Cong. Globe, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1834)). This is the 
only time a U.S. President has been officially censured by the Senate. Id. 
174. Id. at 441. 
175. R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court Under Marshall and 
Taney 93 (2d ed. 2006). 
176. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
177. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The 
First Hundred Years, 1789–1888, at 264 (1985) (describing Dred Scott 
as “bad judicial politics”); see also George Ticknor Curtis, The Dred Scott 
Case: As Remembered by Justice Curtis’s Family, 10 Green Bag 2d 213, 
224–38 (2007) (describing extreme procedural irregularities by Chief Justice 
Taney in issuing his opinion, which was very controversial at the time). 
178. See Newmyer, supra note 175, at 94 (“As United States attorney general 
(1831–33) and secretary of the treasury (1833), [Taney] revealed an anti-
monopolistic, state mercantilist, democratic bias that made him one of 
President Jackson’s closest advisers. He brought this bias to the chief 
justiceship . . . .”). 
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was contrary to longstanding legal precedent.179 Constitutional scholars 
today recognize that anti-monopoly decisions like Charles River Bridge 
“reflect Taney’s infusion of his own values into the Constitution, 
something that became notorious in Dred Scott.”180 Another historian 
has observed in more delicate language that Chief Justice Taney and 
his fellow Jacksonian Justices had a clear “preference for expediency 
over doctrine” and thus they “shaped constitutional law to serve the 
political and economic imperatives of the new age.”181 
Patent law was not immune from this new policy-driven juris–
prudence of the “new age” of the Taney Court. In 1852 in Bloomer v. 
McQuewan,182 another foundational case for the exhaustion doctrine in 
patent law,183 Chief Justice Taney expressly rewrote the patent statutes 
to define patents as state-granted franchises. The 1836 Patent Act 
defined patents in terms of the classic property rights of acquiring, 
using, and disposing of one’s possessions, as did all the prior patent 
statutes.184 In Bloomer, Chief Justice Taney held that patents are 
“franchise[s]” that secure only “a right to exclude.”185 This is now the 
modern definition of the property right in a patent,186 but it was 
contrary to the explicit definition of patents as property rights in the 
statutes in force at the time. Patent law historian, Edward 
Walterscheid, states that Chief Justice Taney’s Bloomer opinion 
 
179. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 583–607 
(1837) (Story, J., dissenting). 
180. John O. McGinnis, The Once Famous Charles River Bridge Case, Law 
& Liberty (June 26, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/06/ 
26/the-once-famous-but-largely-forgotten-charles-river-bridge-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/3V4V-UDQT]. 
181. Newmyer, supra note 175, at 113. 
182. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). 
183. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 
(2017); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008). 
184. See Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117, 121 (1836) 
(repealed 1870) (providing that “every patent shall be assignable in law” 
and that this “conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent, to make 
and use, and to grant to others to make and use, the thing patented” must 
“be recorded in the Patent Office”); Patent Act of 1793, Pub. L. No. 2-11, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (1793) (repealed 1836) (providing that a patent secures 
“the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, and 
vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery”); Patent Act 
of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793) 
(providing that a patent secures “the sole and exclusive right and liberty of 
making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said 
invention or discovery”). 
185. Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 549. 
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018) (defining a patent as securing only the “right 
to exclude”). 
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represented an “extraordinary holding which appeared on its face so 
contradictory to the statutory language.”187 
In sum, the flouting of well-established legal rules was not unusual 
for Chief Justice Taney in patent cases or in other areas of law. In 
Morse, he attacked Claim Eight as an attempt by Morse to monopolize 
an entire field of telecommunications and commerce. The conclusion 
reached in Morse comported well with Chief Justice Taney’s abhorrence 
of state-granted monopolies and his commitment to economic populism. 
Similar to his actions in so many other areas of law, he reached this 
result by ignoring established legal rules for interpreting principle 
claims in patents.  
Notably, Amos Kendall, Morse’s primary business partner, was also 
a fervent Jacksonian Democrat who had joined with Taney in 1833 as 
cabinet officers in executing President Jackson’s illegal order to kill the 
U.S. Bank. Kendall, though, was apparently willing to set aside his 
political principles in favor of his financial interests in Morse’s patents 
and in the successful franchise business model he developed with the 
Magnetic Telegraph Company.188 Perhaps because Chief Justice Taney 
remained in public service, his decisions in cases like Morse, Bloomer, 
and Winans suggest that he could not so easily abandon the political 
ideology that earned him his position on the Supreme Court. 
Conclusion 
Morse’s electro-magnetic telegraph was one of the many pioneering 
inventions that produced explosive growth in the U.S. innovation 
economy in the nineteenth century. Among lawyers, judges, and 
scholars today, Morse is instead known as a would-be monopolist who 
attempted to claim control over telecommunication technologies far 
beyond the limits of the electro-magnetic telegraph he invented in the 
1830s. This conventional wisdom among legal elites is understandable 
because it is a byproduct of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Morse. 
Once Morse is situated within its proper historical and legal context, 
however, it becomes clear this view of Morse and his patented invention 
is deeply mistaken. 
The nature of Morse’s patent, as well as his litigation practices in 
The Great Telegraph Case, reflected the well-settled and understood 
practices of drafting and asserting principle claims in early American 
patent law. Morse may have used some overreaching language if one 
 
187. Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and 
the Copyright Power, 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 307, 330 (2005). 
188. See John, supra note 65, at 65–77; Wolff, supra note 121, at 20 (“After a 
political career as a Jacksonian opponent of state-sponsored monopoly—
particularly the monstrous state-granted monopoly of the Bank of the 
United States—Kendall now became an ardent defender of the patent 
monopoly the state had granted Morse and his associates.”). 
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reads Claim Eight in isolation, treating it as a peripheral claim under 
modern patent doctrine, but this was not how inventors, lawyers, or 
judges drafted, interpreted, or applied patent claims in the Antebellum 
Era. It was arguably Chief Justice Taney who overreached in Morse, 
not Morse himself. It is only an accident for Chief Justice Taney that 
later developments in U.S. patent law, such as the evolution of 
peripheral claiming and the literal infringement doctrine, have made 
Morse appear to be more correct today than it was in 1854. 
